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A COURT IN NEED AND A FRIEND INDEED: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE AMicus
CURIAE IN THE QUEBEC SECESSION REFERENCE
Bruce Ryder

INTRODUCTION
The amicus curiae took on a daunting challenge in
assuming the task assigned to him by the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference.' In
agreeing to fill the gap left by the absence of the Quebec
government from the proceedings, and in presenting
arguments opposed to the positions taken by the
Attorney General of Canada, Maitre Andr6 Joli-Coeur
confronted a legal deck stacked against him. The federal
government framed the reference questions in such a
way as to minimize the risk that it would get answers
that it did not like. The questions were aimed directly at
the legal achilles heel of the sovereignty movement,
namely, that their project prior to and following the
1995 referendum had relied ultimately on the possibility
of pursuing a unilateral declaration of independence, a
rupture of the Canadian constitutional order.2
The vast majority of legal scholars agree that
Quebec has no right to unilateral secession in domestic
or international law.' It came as no surprise, then, that
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Secession Reference
dismissed all of the amicus' arguments in short order.

2

Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998) 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385
(all further paragraph references in the text are to this decision).
Section 26 of Bill 1,An Act respecting the future of Quebec, I st
Sess., 35th Leg., Quebec, 1995, would have authorized the
National Assembly to unilaterally proclaim sovereignty after a
Yes vote in a referendum if negotiations with the government
of Canada subsequently "proved fruitless". See also J. Parizeau,
"La declaration unilat rale est indispensable" Le Devoir (16
septembre 1997) A 1l.
See, for example, T.M. Franck et al., "L'int6grit6 territoriale du
Quebec dans l'hypoth6se de l'accession Ala souverainete" in
Commission d'6tude des questions aff~rentes t l'aceession du
Quebec A ]a souverainet6, ed., Les attributs d'un Quibec
souverain: Exposes et 6tudes, Vol. 1 (Quebec: National
Assembly, 1992) 377 at 419-25; S. Williams, International
Legal Effects of Secession by Quebec (Background Studies of
the York University Constitutional Reform Project, Study No.
3) (North York, Ont.: York University Centre for Public Law
and Public Policy, 1992); N. Finkelstein et al., "Does Quebec
Have a Right to Secede at International Law?" (1995) 74 Can.
Bar Rev. 225; J. Woehrling, "Les aspects juridiques d'une
6ventuelle secession du Qudbec" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 293;
J. Webber, "The Legality of a Unilateral Declaration of
Independence under Canadian Law" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 281.
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What is perhaps more surprising is that the authority of
the Supreme Court's opinion was nevertheless quickly
accepted by the government of Quebec. Many of the
arguments put forward by the amicus had formed the
basis of the Quebec government's refusal to participate
in the proceedings. Similarly, the amicus presented the
same arguments used by sovereignists to portray the
unilateral path to sovereignty as legitimate and
ultimately lawful.
In this comment, I will briefly canvass the amicus'
arguments and the Supreme Court's response to them.
Then I will explore how the Supreme Court was able to
bring sovereignists into a conversation framed by its
opinion, at the same time as it was pulling the legal rug
they had previously relied upon out from underneath
them.

ARGUMENTS OF THE AMiCUs CURIAE
On the distinctly unfriendly legal terrain presented
by the reference questions, the friend of the court
pursued two basic strategies in his submissions.
The first strategy was to argue that the Supreme
Court should not answer the questions. Me Joli-Coeur
argued that the Court should refuse to issue an opinion
because the questions were too theoretical, 4 too

political,' too hypothetical,6 were concerned solely with
international law,7 and, in any case, federal and
provincial laws conferring the power to hear references
on the Supreme Court and provincial courts of appeal,
respectively, are unconstitutional.8

Mdmoire de 'amicus curiae (18 decembre 1997) paras. 28-37.
Ibid., paras. 38-41.
Ibid., paras. 42-45.
Ibid., paras. 46-53.
Ibid., paras. 8-23. The argument in the factum focuses on the
constitutional validity of s.53 of the Supreme CourtAct. In his
responses to the written questions directed to him by the
justices, Me Joli-Coeur took the position that the provincial
statutes authorizing references were also invalid (Rdponses
dcrites aux questions posdes par la Cour Supreme du Canada A
I'amicus curiae, 6 mars 1998, question 1).

The Court summarily dismissed each of these
preliminary objections to its jurisdiction. The questions
were justiciable: they had a sufficient legal component
and were precise enough to permit a legal answer (paras.
28, 31). The reference jurisdiction was re-affirmed since
the Canadian constitution lacks a rigid separation of
powers that would prohibit the Court from issuing
advisory opinions (para. 15). The argument that the
Court should refrain from addressing an issue of
international law was characterized as "groundless"
(para.22). The legal rights and obligations of the
government of Quebec in relation to secession could not
be determined without a consideration of international
law (para. 23). The position taken by the government of
Quebec in the Bertrandand Singh proceedings in 1995
and 1996 - that the process of Quebec's accession to
sovereignty was purely a matter of international law and
beyond the jurisdiction of domestic tribunals9 - was
thus firmly rejected.
Me Joli-Coeur's second strategy for avoiding a
contest he could not win was to answer different
questions than those presented to the Court. Instead of
pressing the argument that Quebec has a right of
unilateral secession, and the federal government a
corresponding obligation to facilitate the exercise of that
right, Me Joli-Coeur's submissions stayed for the most
part on firmer ground. He argued that a legally effective
unilateral secession is possible and is not prohibited by
international law.' 0 He conceded that the international
right of all peoples to self-determination did not give the
Quebec people a right to secede." However, he argued,
the unilateral establishment of a sovereign Quebec state
will be recognized at international law if Quebec can
establish effective control over its territory. 2 Domestic
constitutional law, he said, eventually would have to
yield to the reality of an effectively sovereign Quebec
state.' 3 When pushed, in questioning from the Court, to
reveal details of his position - for example, how le
principe d'effectivit would operate, and how it would
deal with the competing rights of self-determination of
the multiple peoples within Quebec (and Canada) - Me
Joli-Coeur reverted to his first strategy (as counsel for
The Bertrand and Singh actions, and the Quebec government's
motions to dismiss them, were described in the Attorney
General of Canada's factum at paras. 18-50. See Bertrand v.
Begin (1995) 127 D.L.R. (4th) 408 (Que. S.C.); Bertrand v.
Quebec (Attorney General), (1996) 138 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (Que.
S.C.); motion to dismiss, Singh v. Attorney General of Quebec
(30 April 1996) Montreal: 500-05-011275-953 (Sup. Ct.).
10 Mdmoire de l'amicus curiae, paras. 75-81.
M~moire de l'amicus curiae, paras. 92-112; Addendum au
m~moire de I'amicus curiae, 5 f~vrier 1998, paras. 14-18. In his
oral responses to the Court's questions, Me Joli-Coeur put more
bluntly what his written submissions said more obliquely: "nous
ne croyons pas avoir soumis A la Cour que le droit A
l'autodtermination 6galait droit i la secession" (R6ponses
6crites aux questions pos6es par ]a Cour Supreme du Canada i
I'amicus curiae, question 15).
12
M~moire de l'amicus curiae, paras. 87-91, 109-112.
"
Ibid., paras. 73, 114.

9

the Attorney General of Canada did in response to
similarly difficult questions directed to him): the Court's
too political, or beyond
questions were too hypothetical,
4
the Court's jurisdiction.
The heart of the amicus' submissions can be
summarized as follows: Quebec may proceed
unilaterally to accomplish the secession of Quebec from
Canada by virtue of the principle of effectivity. A
secession will be effective when the government of
Quebec exercises all state authority over the territory of
Quebec. The establishment of effective and exclusive
sovereignty will be founded on the democratic
legitimacy of a majority vote of the Qufbfcois people
exercising their right of self-determination. Me JoliCoeur's arguments were not novel or unusual in this
regard; the principle of effectivity has been suggested as
the legal basis of Quebec's accession to sovereignty by
a range of scholars. Frfmont and Boudreault, for
example, have argued that the Canadian constitution
does not apply to secession and thus Quebec "serait
alors lui-mfme condamn6 i procfder A sa propre
rfvolution."' 5 Like the amicus curiae's submissions,
sovereignist scholarship in recent years has shifted from
reliance on a right of self-determination to reliance on
the alleged legitimacy and eventual legality of an
effective assertion of sovereignty."
The view that a unilateral secession can lead
ultimately to the establishment of a new sovereign state
recognized by other members of the international
community is as uncontroversial as the federal
government's position that a unilateral process would
amount to an illegal rupture of Canadian constitutional
continuity. Should the Quebec government and people
choose to pursue the unilateral path to sovereignty,
however, we are all in for a perilous journey. If Quebec
were to follow the amicus' approach and attempt to
assert effective control to achieve international
recognition of an illegal secession, and if the federal
government were to continue to take the position that it
has an obligation to uphold the existing constitutional
order until a negotiated settlement is reached, then the
spectre of civil disorder and violence would loom large.
The failure to even acknowledge the risk of such
disastrous consequences accompanying a unilateral
secession was the most troubling aspect of the amicus'
submissions.

's

16

Rdponses 6crites aux questions poses par laCour Supreme du
Canada r'amicuscuriae, question 10.
J. Fremont et F. Boudreault, "Supraconstitutionallit6 canadienne
etsecession du Quebec" (1997) 8 N.J.C.L. 163 at 203.
See, for example, H. Brun & G. Tremblay, Droit
constitutionnel, 2d ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1990)
at 236-37; J. Woehrling, "Les aspects juridiques d'une
6ventuelle secession du Quebec" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 293
at 314-22; D. Turp, "Supplement" in J. Brossard, L 'accession
i la souverainetg et le cas du Quebec: conditions et modalitds
politico-juridiques, 2e ed. (Montreal: Presses de I'Universit6 de
Montreal, 1995) at 800-801.

(1998) 10:1

CONSTITUTIONAL

FORUM

Moreover, the reliance on the principle of
effectivity raises a host of practical and theoretical
problems, some of them highlighted in the written
questions members of the Court directed at the amicus.
One basic problem is that the principle of effectivity will
come into operation only when the government of
Canada has ceased to exercise sovereign authority in
Quebec. When asked by the Court how, when and
according to what principles the federal government
should or must withdraw, the amicus had nothing to say
(other than that the question itself is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court). 17 This question highlights the
difference between unilateral secession as an initially
illegal course of action that might become legally
effective if a new regime can exercise exclusive
sovereignty, and unilateral secession as a right that
imposes corresponding obligations on the government
of Canada. As Professor Crawford stated in his reply to
the amicus' experts, "international law permits the
metropolitan state to oppose [secession] by all means
consistent with non-derogable human rights and
humanitarian law, permits the conduct [of secessionists]
to be classified as criminal, and prohibits other states
from providing any material assistance to [the
secessionists].' ' Moreover, the Attorney General of
Canada took the position before the Court that the
federal government has an obligation to ensure respect
for the existing constitution. 9 Unless the government of
Canada changes its position, the principle of effectivity
would only come into play if the exercise of Canadian
sovereignty is ousted by the use of force.
Another basic question raised by the amicus'
position is whether any group can rely on the principle
of effectivity to secede unilaterally from an established
state such as Canada (or a future sovereign Quebec, for
that matter). How does the principle espoused by Me
Joli-Coeur contain such anarchic possibilities?
Me Joli-Coeur did not rely on the principle of
effective control alone. He implicitly acknowledged that
some secessionist attempts at establishing control
through revolutionary means are worthy of respect and
others properly resisted by the state. In Quebec's case,
he argued that the assertion of effective control would
be legitimized by the Qudbdcois people's expression
through democratic means of their right of selfdetermination. In other words, recourse to the principle
R~ponses 6crites aux questions posfes par laCour Supreme du
Canada A l'amicus curiae, question 10.
"
James Crawford, Response to Expert Reporis of the Amicus
Curiae, 12 January 1998, para. 17.
9 The Attorney General's factum and reply contain no such
statement. However, when asked by the Court whether the
government of Canada is required to oppose secession, the
Attorney General wrote that "it is the duty of the Government
of Canada... to respect and uphold the Constitution of Canada
and to preserve and maintain the rule of law" (Written Response
of the Attorney General of Canada to Questions from the
Supreme Court of Canada, 6 March 1998, para. 53).
17
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of effectivity is particularly legitimate when a people
has exercised its right of self-determination by putting
its political future to a democratic vote. Me Joli-Coeur
conceded that the right of self-determination cannot be
equated, in Quebec's case, to a right to secede. 0 But, he
seemed to suggest, the right of self-determination may
provide moral and political legitimacy to any attempt to
assert effective control if secession is the choice of the
people. In that sense, he says, the exercise of the right of
self-determination by "le peuple qufb&cois fait partie du
processus de la sfcession 6ventuelle du Quebec."'"
This position begs an important question: who
exactly is "le peuple qufbdcois"? Is there a single people
within the province of Quebec? In the amicus'
submissions, as in political discourse in Quebec more
generally, there is considerable slippage between civic
and ethnic understandings of the Quebec people. That is,
sometimes "le peuple qufbfcois" includes all persons
living in the province, at other times it seems to include
only Quebecers who are of French Canadian heritage.
Pressed to clarify his position on this issue by the Court,
Me Joli-Coeur conceded that there is not a single people
living in Quebec. To his credit, and in contrast to the
official Parti Qufbdcois position, he said that the eleven
Aboriginal nations in Quebec have the same rights as "le
peuple qufbfcois" to unilateral secession relying on the
principle of effectivity as an expression of their right of
self-determination. 2
Further, when asked if there is a Canadian people,
Me Joli-Coeur took the uncontrovertible position that
there is no single Canadian people. Rather, he said, there
is at least an English-Canadian people, a Qufbdcois
people, Aboriginal peoples, and an Acadian people73 He
acknowledged that all peoples have recourse to the same
rights at international law. According to the amicus'
own logic then, Aboriginal peoples and representatives
of the English-Canadian people within Quebec may
choose to exercise their democratic right to stay in
Canada. The principle of effectivity, when it draws its
legitimacy from a people's exercise of the right of selfdetermination, leads directly to partitionist scenarios
given that Quebec, like the rest of Canada, is a
multinational society.
Therefore, far from being compatible with the rule
of law, as the amicus contended,2 4 reliance on the
principle of effectivity as the sole legal norm relevant to
the achievement of sovereignty leads to a situation
where we would have two competing regimes, one legal

20

Supra note 11.

M~moire de I'amicus curiae, para. 112.
R~ponses dcrites aux questions pos~es par laCour Supreme du
Canada i l'amicus curiae, question 14 et question 18.
23 Rfponses 6crites aux questions posdes par laCour Supreme du
Canada i I'amicus curiae, question 21.
24
M~moire de l'amicus curiae, paragraphe 138; Duplique de
I'amicus curiae, 2 fevrier 1998, paras. 87-91.
21
22

and constitutional, the other illegal and unconstitutional,
both claiming authority over the same territory and
peoples, both with passionate supporters relying on the
exercise of their right to self-determination and the view
that international law eventually will recognize the
victor in the struggle -for effective control. This is a
scenario fraught with risks of social, economic, and
political disorder.

authority over the legal framework for secession ahead
of time, and quite another to reject the Court's authority
after the legal basis of the objection has been dismissed.
Legality and legitimacy are intertwined, and the
government of Quebec's hopes of garnering
international support for sovereignty will not be
improved if it openly flouts the Supreme Court's views
on the legalities of secession.

In light of these difficulties, it came as no surprise
that the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the
principle of effectivity gives rise to a legal right to
unilateral secession. The principle of effectivity, the
judges said, "proclaims that an illegal act may
eventually acquire legal status if, as a matter of
empirical fact, it is recognized on the international
plane." However, the subsequent condonation of an
illegal act does not "retroactively create a legal right to
engage in the act in the first place" (para. 146). The
Court commented that while unilateral secession would
therefore be initially illegal according to both domestic
and international law, "this does not rule out the
possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of
secession leading to a defacto secession" (para. 155).

Moreover, the Court's opinion contained a number
of gaps and ambiguities that sovereignists could exploit
to portray it as a road map, rather than a roadblock as
they had feared, to the achievement of their ultimate
political goal. For one, the Court managed to avoid
discussing the rigorous requirements for amending the
constitution set out in Part V of the Constitution Act,
1982. This was so even though the negative answer to
the first question necessarily entailed the conclusion that
either (i) the unilateral amending procedure set out in
section 45 of the Act does not apply to secession27 or (ii)
an unwritten amendment procedure applies to secession
rather than the apparently exhaustive written rules set
out in Part V. The federal government had urged the
Court to consider and reject the applicability of section
45, and to not go any further in its investigation of the
application of the written amending formulas.2"
Remarkably, there was no mention whatsoever of any of
the amending procedures in the opinion.

ROAD MAP OR ROADBLOCK?
The government of Quebec moved to dismiss the
Bertrand and Singh declaratory actions in 1995 and
1996, and declined to participate in the Supreme Court
reference itself, on the grounds that domestic law was
irrelevant to the process of secession. Prior to the
hearing, both federalist and sovereignist Quebec
politicians asserted the right of the people of Quebec
alone to determine their political future and urged the
Supreme Court to decline to answer the questions or risk
jeopardizing its remaining legitimacy in Quebec.25 After
the release of the opinion, the government of Quebec
did not continue to reject the Court's authority. Instead,
it immediately entered into a debate regarding the
requirements and implications of the Supreme Court's
opinion.2 6 Given that the arguments of the amicus curiae
were summarily dismissed, and that these arguments
were the ones most commonly relied upon by
sovereignists prior to the release of the opinion, why has
a sovereignist government opted for this course?

This carefully constructed silence suggests that at
least some members of the Court have doubts about
whether Part V applies to secession at all.2 9 The Court
did agree that a lawful secession requires a
constitutional amendment (para. 97). The statement that
negotiations would "require the reconciliation of various
rights and responsibilities by the representatives of two
legitimate majorities, namely, the clear majority of the
population of Quebec, and the clear majority of Canada
as a whole"( paras. 93, 152) suggests that the Court may
be envisioning a bilateral or binational amendment
process far less cumbersome than the dictates of the
7/50 or unanimity procedures set out in sections 38 and
41 of Part V, respectively. By leaving such questions
open, the Court dodged, for the time being, the

In reality, the Parti Qu6b6cois government had no
choice. It is one thing to object to the Supreme Court's
This point was made at length in the factum of the Attorney
General of Canada at paras. 99-115.
2' Ibid. at paras. 116-7.
27

25

26

Parizeau, supra note 2; Bouchard, "Le demier mot revient au
peuple qu6b6cois" Le Devoir (13 f6vrier 1998) A 1l; O'Neill,
"Ryan et Johnson d6noncent le renvoi en Cour supreme" Le
Devoir (4 f6vrier 1998) A6.
Seguin, "Ruling legitimizes sovereignty drive, PQ leaders say"
Globe and Mail (21 August 1998) A7; Cloutier, "Pdquistes et
libraux satisfaits" Le Devoir (21 aoft 1998) A l; Bouchard, "La
demarche souverainiste est 1dgitime" Le Devoir (22 ao~t 1998)
A9; Ducas, "La souverainet6 est renforc6e, croit Bouchard" Le
Devoir (22 aofit 1998) A5.

These doubts are shared by some scholars. See F. Gdlinas, "Les
conventions, le droit et la Constitution du Canada dans le renvoi
sur la 'secession' du Quebec: le fant6me du rapatriement"
(1997) 57 Revue du Barreau 291; W. MacLauchlan,
"Accounting for the Democracy and the Rule of Law in the
Quebec Secession Reference" (1997) 76 Can. Bar Rev. 155; R.
Howse and A. Malkin, "Canadians are a Sovereign People:
How the Supreme Court Should Approach the Reference on
Quebec Secession" (1997) 76 Can. Bar Rev. 186; Fremont et
Boudreault, supra note 15.
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accusation that the written amending procedures place
Quebec in a straitjacket.30
Second, extrapolating creatively from underlying
constitutional principles, the Court forged a new legal
obligation that would be imposed on the other provinces
and the federal government to negotiate with Quebec
following a clear repudiation of the existing
constitutional order. The duty to negotiate secession
would be triggered by a vote of a "clear majority" of the
population of Quebec on a "clear question" (para. 93);
it would not arise if the expression of Quebecers'
democratic will is "fraught with ambiguities" (para.
100). The Court indicated that whether the threshold of
"a clear majority on a clear question" has been met in a
future referendum is a determination to be made by
unspecified "political actors," not the courts (paras. 100,
153).
Sovereignists naturally have found great comfort in
the Court's affirmation that secession is a legitimate
goal and that, indeed, a clear referendum result places an
obligation on the other parties to Confederation to
negotiate secession in good faith. Premier Bouchard and
former Premier Parizeau have insisted that the Supreme
Court opinion legitimizes the process followed in 1995
and nothing need change in any subsequent referendum
campaign.
This is a highly selective reading of the Supreme
Court opinion. In fact, the Court's opinion suggests,
without saying so directly, that the relevant "political
actors" for determining what is a clear question and a
clear majority are all of the parties that would be
involved in negotiations, namely, "all parties to
Confederation." If the Quebec government does not
reach an agreement with other Canadian governments
on the question and the required majority ahead of time,
then it will not be able to claim that all parties have an
obligation to negotiate secession in good faith.32
In addition, the Court clearly expressed the opinion
that a unilateral declaration of sovereignty would be
illegal and secession negotiations extremely difficult.
Therefore, the Court said, negotiations could not
proceed on the assumption that secession inevitably

31

32

See D. Greschner, "The Quebec Secession Reference: Goodbye
to Part V?" (1998) 10 Constitutional Forum 19.
Bouchard, supra note 26; Parizeau, "L'avis de ]a Cour supreme
se fonde sur un malentendu qui prend sa source dans la
'd~monisation' systematique des souverainistes" Le Devoir (3
septembre 1998) A9. Parizeau, "Et si les n6gociations
dchouaient?" Le Devoir (4 septembre 1998) Al l.
In his letter of August 25, 1998 to Premier Bouchard, the
federal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Stdphane Dion,
wrote that "the federal government, among others, cannot
surrender its responsibility to evaluate the clarity of a question
which could restilt in the break-up of the country." The full text
of the letter can be found on the Ministerial website at
http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/ro/doc/eaug2698.htm.
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would be successfully accomplished: "such a foregone
conclusion would actually undermine the obligation to
negotiate and render it hollow" (para. 91). It follows that
if the government of Quebec continues to suggest that
secession would be a fait accompli following a clear
referendum result, and continues to openly contemplate
the prospect of unilateral secession in case negotiations
reach an impasse, then the "other parties to
Confederation" would be entitled to insist that they have
no obligation to enter negotiations.

CONCLUSION
Maitre Joli-Coeur struggled valiantly to make legal
arguments to support a position contrary to that taken by
the Attorney General of Canada in the Secession
Reference. His submissions, however, accomplished
only one thing: they revealed the weakness of the best
available arguments in support of a legal right to
unilateral secession. In this sense, the amicus proved to
be a friend of the Court indeed. His contributions lent
greater authority to the Court's rejection of the legal
arguments that had previously undergirded the unilateral
component of sovereignist strategy leading up to the
1995 referendum. The defective legal underpinnings of
this strategy have now been effectively exposed, and the
debate shifted to the threshold conditions that would
have to be met before a duty to negotiate secession in
good faith arises. The justices should be applauded for
crafting an opinion that seeks to minimize the risks of
social disorder that would accompany any unilateral
declaration of sovereignty and to maximize the chances
of a negotiated, peaceful accommodation of the political
aspirations of a clear majority of Quebecers clearly
expressed in any future referendum.Q

Bruce Ryder
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. These
comments, originally presented at the Joint Session of
CALT/CLSA/CPSA, Congress of Social Sciences and
Humanities, University of Ottawa, June 3, 1998, have
been revised following the release of the Supreme Court
of Canada's opinion in the Reference re Secession of
Quebec.

